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State owned vs. privately owned firms: whose CEOs are better compensated?
Abstract
This paper investigates CEO pay and pay-performance relationshipin China s listed firms. We distinguish
four firm types based on theircontrolling owners: state owned enterprises affiliated with stateasset
management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprisesaffiliated with the central government (SOECGs),
state ownedenterprises affiliated with a local government (SOELGs), and privatefirms controlled by private
investors. We also distinguish betweenfirms with foreign investors and those without. Because
thedifferent types of controlling owners have different objectives,motivations, and political interests, they
affect managerscompensation in the firms in which they invest. Our results indicatethat CEO pay is
lowest in SAMB controlled firms and highest inSOECG controlled firms. Not only is CEO pay positively
associatedwith firm performance, the positive pay-performance relationship isstronger in both types of
SOE firms but weaker in privatelycontrolled firms. In addition, firms with foreign investorscompensate
their CEOs more highly than those without foreigninvestors, an effect that is significant in both SOEs and
privatelycontrolled firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that CEOcompensation in China is jointly
determined by firm performance,market-oriented reform and the unique ownership structure,meaning that
standard theories of efficient compensation contracts may not apply in such emerging markets.
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Abstract
This paper examines the impact that ownership structure has on the pay-performance
relationship in China’s listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of the ultimate
controlling shareholder have a positive effect on this relationship while a divergence
between the control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect.
By dividing our sample into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management
bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms, we find that cash flow rights in SOE
controlled firms have a significant impact on accounting based pay performance and
cash flow rights in privately controlled firms also affect the market performance based
relationship, however, CEO pay in SAMB controlled firms bear no relationship with
either accounting or market based performance. We therefore argue that CEO pay
is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is
insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling
shareholders to maximize their profits.
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Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance
relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms
1. Introduction
In recent years two strands of research on the effect that ownership structure has
on pay-performance relationship has begun to emerge. The first focused on the effects
of cash flow rights and excess control rights on CEO pay (Masulis et al., 2009;
Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). With US dual-class firms Masulis et al. (2009) found that
the divergence of insider control-cash flow rights had a positive effect on CEO pay,
while from a sample of Italian listed firms, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) acknowledged
that there was a negative effect. The second focused the effects of different types of
ultimate shareholders, particularly between state and non-state owned firms in a
transition economy (Ke et al., 1999; Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006). They all
found that the pay-performance relationship was significantly different across firms
with alternative styles of controlling shareholders, and proved that it was determined
by them.
Extant research on the effects that separation of ownership and control has on firm
performance and value is well established (Cleassens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins,
2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Masulis et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2010). Indeed it
is common practice to have concentrated ownership and dominant shareholders in
modern publicly traded companies where the largest shareholders exercise control
through their voting rights despite having relatively small amounts of cash flow rights.
The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights (excess control rights)
gives them the ability and incentive to expropriate the wealth of other investors and
pursue their own interests, which are often diametrically opposed to those of minority
investors. Therefore, while the largest shareholder can mitigate agency conflict
between shareholders and managers, it leaves the agency conflict between largest
shareholders and minority shareholders as primarily an agency problem. This problem

2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663210

becomes particularly severe in transition economies where ownership is concentrated
and investors lack legal protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin et al., 2010).
There was no evidence that the separation of control and cash flow rights affected
the pay-performance relationship, which is important for corporate governance
because in an economy with concentrated ownership, the largest shareholders have
strong incentives to directly monitor managers by relating CEO pay to firm
performance (Murphy, 1999). Nevertheless, the largest shareholders will also
maintain their private benefits by having CEO pay schemes unrelated to the wealth of
minority shareholders. In this paper we examine the effect that ownership structure,
specifically the cash flow rights and control rights of the largest shareholders, has on
the pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms.
One key feature of these firms is that many of them are state owned enterprises
(SOEs) carved out of former state controlled firms 1 . In these SOEs, controlling
shareholders own substantial control rights in excess of their cash flow rights through
a long principal-agent chain, a significant pyramid structure, and cross-shareholdings
of ownership. Guided by the reform and privatization process, the state relinquished
controls over some SOEs by either selling the shares to the public or allowing
takeovers. Along with the IPOs of privately controlled firms since 2001, publicly
trading SOEs have evolved into an important component of China’s listed firms.
Since state controlled and non-state controlled firms have different operating
objectives due to the nature of their ownership (e.g. they are subject to different
regulations), this has had different results on the pay-performance relationship
between them. Therefore, the Chinese context provides an excellent laboratory for us
to examine and explain the effects of ownership structure, particularly the divergence
between control rights and cash flow rights on the pay-performance relationship.
Within state-controlled firms the controlling shareholders actually belong to
different state owned entities and government agents, which means that each group
uses a performance-based pay scheme that best suits their objectives. It was argued
that these state controlled firms operate with multiple objectives that varied between
1

Privately controlled listed firms have only existed in China since 2001.
3
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maximizing the wealth of shareholders, maintaining urban employment levels, and
controlling sensitive industries (Clarke, 2003). This study only covers the early years
of economic reform in China. To gain a clearer understanding of this issue, we
classified state controlled firms into two types of ownership based on ultimate
controlling shareholders, i.e., state assets management bureaus (SAMBs), and state
owned enterprises (SOEs). SAMB is a government agency charged with managing
and controlling state owned assets where CEOs work as representatives of the
government, so their pay scheme may not be based on performance. One reason for
the existence of publicly listed SOEs is to transform them into modern market
oriented firms to maximize profitability.
In 1985, China introduced market oriented wage reform along with other
economic reforms in state controlled firms where general managers worked as
bureaucrats and were paid according to the civil service pay scale. In 1985, the
Ministry of Labor announced that CEO payment in SOEs should be linked to firm
economic performance (the Ministry of Labor, 2000). However, this scheme did not
provide sufficient incentive because these SOEs were still under the previous system
where profits and wages were redistributed by the state (Yueh, 2004). With the
establishment of two stock exchanges in the early 1990s and the State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003,
the SOEs were restructured and listed on the two stock exchanges. Since 2003, many
regulations have been promulgated by SASAC to evaluate SOEs and any existing link
between their performance and CEO pay. Specifically, SASAC issued ‘Interim
regulations on the evaluation of the top executive operating performance’ in SOEs
affiliated to the central government (SOECGs) in 2003, which clearly stated that top
executive pay should be related to total profits and sales (SASAC, 2003). Later in
2006 and 2010 respectively, SASAC updated this regulation in those firms where
total profits and sales are still used to measure performance (SASAC, 2006a, 2010) 2 ,
2

Furthermore, in 2007 and 2008, the SASAC announced two ‘supplementary provisions’ of this regulation which
made further efforts on relating executive pay to firm performance in SOEs (SASAC, 2007, 2008). Meanwhile, in
2004, 2006 and 2009, the SASAC also promulgated the ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive
pay in SOECGs’, ‘Interim regulations on the evaluation and administration of SOECG performance’ and ‘Interim
regulations on the evaluation and administration of state owned financial institutions firm performance’ (SASAC,
4

by describing how to evaluate executive performance, and including a requirement
that a CEO should resign if they fail to perform. Obviously, by putting these
regulations into practice, SASAC has decreed that profitability be the primary
measure of firm performance, and CEO pay is to be linked to it (SASAC, 2004,
2006b). Meanwhile, to curtail CEO’s from expropriating shareholder wealth through
excessive perks, SASAC also promulgated ‘Instructions on regulating top executive
‘on-job’ consumptions in SOECGs’ in 2006 (SASAC, 2006c) 3 .
These reforms and regulations of executive compensation in SOE’s are largely
aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and management. Extant literature
found a positive pay-performance relationship in both SOE and privately controlled
firms but not in SAMB controlled firms (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006,
2007). These results confirmed that the goals of these reforms in SOEs and CEO
compensation have only been achieved to some extent.
In China’s weak corporate governance environment with its lack of legal
protection for investors, the largest shareholders are facing strong incentives to
monitor managers and operations if they are to retain their substantial cash flow rights.
However, if their control rights exceed their cash flow rights they are likely to pursue
their own interests and may seek to expropriate other investors by tunneling, related
party sales, and transferring profits out of the company (Johnson et al., 2000).
Therefore, the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights and excess control rights may
have different effects on the pay-performance relationship. Our first hypotheses states
that:
•

H1a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on pay-performance
relationship.

•

H1b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on pay-performance
relationship.

One important characteristic of China’s listed firms is that the majority of
2004, 2006b, 2009).
3
At the local levels, the local SASACs located across the country have also issued regulations based on their local
specific characteristics according to the regulations from the central SASAC. For example, Beijing SASAC
promulgated ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in Beijing SOEs’ in 2004, which has
the same effects of relating CEO pay to firm performance (Beijing SASAC, 2004).
5

controlling shareholders are state-owned entities or government agents, and the shares
they hold are not tradeable5 on the stock exchanges. As a result, these shareholders
have an incentive to set CEO pay based on accounting-linked performance indicators
which gives them an opportunity to expropriate other investors with more resources,
instead of market based indicators which tend to link CEO pay with maximizing their
wealth. Accordingly, we argue that state shareholders emphasize maximizing profits
rather than stock return while shares in privately controlled firms held by the largest
shareholders can be freely traded. We believe that private investors are equally likely
to focus on market performance as well as cash flows and therefore we formulate the
following hypotheses:
•

H2a: Cash flow rights in state controlled firms have a positive effect on
accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while cash
flow rights in non-state controlled firms have a positive effect on market
performance based pay-performance relationship.

•

H2b: Excess control rights in state controlled firms have a negative effect
on accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while
excess control rights in non-state controlled firms have a negative effect on
market performance based pay-performance relationship.

Under China’s SASAC, SOEs are directly and ultimately controlled by both
central and local government, where it is mandatory that state owners must receive
cash flows, including profits and dividends, because shares of SOEs are often not
tradable unless under the approval of the CSRC and the selling price is only at book
value (Xu, 2003). Since 2003, CEOs of SOEs have been evaluated by a combination
of annual performance such as return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS)
(SASAC, 2003). We therefore hypothesize that:
•

H3a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on accounting based
pay-performance relationship in SOEs.

•

H3b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on accounting based
pay-performance relationship in SOEs.

6

SAMBs 4 are the agency holding state shares that are non-tradable on the market,
they do not have cash flow rights from these shares and payouts often have to be
remitted directly to different levels of government (Firth et al., 2006). The objectives
of SAMB controlled firms are to carry out the instructions of the central or local
government and to maintain local employment levels rather than maximize the value
of a firm. In most instances CEOs in SAMB controlled firms are officials from the
government, with little or no professional background, no rights to select other top
executives, and no responsibility for the economic consequences (Zhang, 1998). We
therefore hypothesize the following:
•

H4: Cash flow rights and excess control rights have no effect on
pay-performance relationship in SAMB controlled firms.

Our results indicate that SOEs relate CEO pay to firm accounting performance
(return on assets and return on sales), while private controlled firms relate CEO pay to
market performance (stock return). However, there is no relationship between CEO
pay and firm performance in firms controlled by SAMBs. Our regression results show
that the cash flow rights of the largest shareholders enhance the accounting
performance related pay scheme in SOE controlled firms and improve market
performance related pay scheme in privately controlled firms. However, the
separation between control rights and cash flow rights shows a negative entrenchment
effects by significantly reducing the pay-performance relationship in SOE and
privately controlled firms. We also find that cash flow rights in SAMB controlled
firms do not appear to affect the pay-performance relationship, which confirm the
consensus that these firms do not really have cash flow rights because they must remit
earnings back to their superiors (Firth et al., 2006).
We make two major contributions to the literature. First, our research not only
sheds light on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect CEO pay, it also
submits new evidence on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect the
4

The term SAMB encompasses state asset management bureaus, state asset operating companies, and
state agencies like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture. However, SAMBs, located
across provinces and cities, are merely agents of the central government that manage state-owned
assets and invest them in listed firms.
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pay-performance relationship. Cash flow rights have a positive incentive effect on the
pay-performance relationship while excess control rights have a negative
entrenchment effect. Second, our study furthers the understanding that different
performance based pay schemes are used between state owned enterprises (SOEs) and
privately controlled firms. The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights
influences pay-performance relationship across firms with different types of ultimate
ownership. Our evidence suggests that CEO pay in firms with the state as the
controlling shareholder is determined by accounting based performance that is not
sensitive to market based firm performance. This is consistent with the private
benefits of controlling shareholders because there the CEO pay scheme is to
maximize accounting performance to extract greater cash flows.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature;
Section 3 outlines the data and methodology; Section 4 discusses the empirical results;
and Section 5 presents the conclusions.

2. Literature review
All extant studies document that disproportional ownership structure has two
effects on corporate governance; the positive incentive effect of cash flow rights
which enable the largest shareholder to monitor CEO’s efficiently, and the negative
entrenchment effect of excess control rights which makes it easier for the largest
shareholder to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.
The separation of ownership and control by the largest shareholder has been
researched extensively, particularly the cash flow rights and control rights stemming
from a concentration of ownership. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) argued that the
ultimate controlling shareholders often use a pyramid structure and cross shareholding
to obtain excessive control rights over their cash flow rights. Cash flow rights are
found to have a positive incentive effect while the divergence between control and
cash flow rights has a negative entrenchment effect on corporate governance
(Claessens et al., 2002). Similar results were also provided by Lemmon and Lins
(2003), Laeven and Levine (2008) and Gompers et al. (2010). Moreover, Johnson et al.
8

(2000) argue that managerial expropriation is an important form of tunneling which
lowers shareholder value. Masulis et al. (2009) agreed and found a positive
relationship between control-cash flow rights divergence and CEO pay, while
Barontini and Bozzi (2010) found evidence from a sample of Italian listed firms that
CEO pay was positively affected by a low divergence of control-cash flow rights.
Other studies argued that ownership structure affects the pay-performance relationship.
Using a sample of U.S. insurance companies from 1994 to 1996, Ke et al. (1999)
found that managerial compensation and ROA was closely related in public-held
insurers. With a sample of China’s listed firms between 1998 and 2002, Kato and
Long (2005) found that state ownership weakened the pay-performance relationship.
Firth et al. (2006) argued that firms having foreign investor or SOEs as their largest
shareholder tended to relate CEO pay to accounting performance, whereas firms with
a private blockholder as a dominant shareholder tended to relate CEO pay to the
performance of the stock market. However, these studies only focused on who the
controlling shareholder (i.e. owner type) was and their effect on the pay-performance
relationship, they did not explain the channel through which these effects were
exercised.
In this paper we fill the gap by using samples of China’s listed firms from 2002 to
2007 to examine how and why the largest shareholder ownership structure affects the
pay-performance relationship.

3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample
We compile data from every firm listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2007 because information on cash flow
rights and control rights has only been available since 2002. Following previous
studies, we account for the special consideration of regulated industries by eliminating
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financial firms. PT and ST 5 companies are also excluded because they might bias our
results. Finally, we exclude observations with incomplete information on all the
variables under analysis. The final sample consists of 1,129 firms and 6,297 firm-year
observations from 2002 to 2007. The accounting and financial data are obtained from
individual firm’s annual reports and the CSMAR database, and the information on
managerial compensation, board, and ownership structure from the SinoFin database.
CSMAR and SinoFin databases were used in several previous studies (Kato and Long,
2005; Firth et al., 2006, 2007).
There was ample evidence in the literature that in firms where ownership was
highly concentrated, the largest shareholders were active in corporate governance and
had absolute control over them. Therefore, it is essential to identify the ultimate
controlling shareholder in order to examine the effects of ownership structure. By
tracing through the chain of ownership we identify the ultimate controlling
shareholder of each firm. Moreover, we classify controlling ownership into three
types: SAMBs, SOEs and private ownership.

3.2. Methodology
Within the corporate governance framework, most previous studies set up linear
models to regress managerial compensation against firm performance and corporate
governance variables (Core et al., 1999; Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Canarella and
Nourayi, 2008; Cornett et al., 2008). Since this study aims to examine the effects of
ownership structure on CEO pay, and test the relationship between managerial
compensation and firm performance, we extend previous research by using the
regression analyses described below.
The first analysis examines the effect that ownership structure has on the
pay-performance relationship across state owned and privately owned (i.e., non-state
owned) firms:

5

ST stands for Special Treatment, refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for three
consecutive years who have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges. PT stands for Particular
Transfer, refers to the listed firms that are suspended to be traded on the stock exchanges. These PT listed firms
can only be traded under the approval of the stock exchanges on every Friday.
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PAYit = α 0 + α1CASH it + α 2 PERFit −1 + α3CASH it * PERFit −1 + α 4 SIZEit
+ α5 BOARDit + α6 PONDit + α 7 LEVit + α8 DUALITYit + α9TENUREit

(1)

+ α10 FORit + Industry + Year + ε it
where i and t represent the firm and year, and ε is the error terms related to
unobservable features that explain cross sectional variations in CEO pay. PAY is the
level of managerial compensation measured by the log of the average top three
executive compensation levels. CASH is the cash flow rights of the controlling
shareholders. In the additional tests we replace cash flow rights with excess control
rights (EXCESS), defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow
rights of the controlling shareholders, to provide some supplementary evidence. PERF
is firm performance, we proxy firm performance with four measures, namely the
return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), annual stock return (RET) and Tobin’s
Q (Q), and then regress them in separate equations. SIZE is the log of the total firm
assets, BOARD is the log of the total number of directors on the board, POND is the
proportion of independent directors, and LEV is the ratio of total debts to total assets.
TENURE is the log of the CEO’s tenure with the firm as CEO, and DUALITY is a
dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the board chairman and 0 otherwise. We
also include dummy variables to control for industry and year effects.
We modify our first regression by dividing the ownership of the largest
shareholder between state ownership and private investors. Our second regression is
shown as follow:

PAYit = α 0 + α1CASH it + α 2 PERFit −1 + α3 PSTATEit * PERFit −1 + α 4 SIZEit
+ α5 BOARDit + α6 PONDit + α 7 LEVit + α8 DUALITYit + α9TENUREit

(2)

+ α10 FORit + Industry + Year + ε it
where PSTATE is the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other variables in
the second regression are defined the same as the first regression.
Furthermore, we extend our second regression by dividing state ownership into
the two types discussed in Section 1: SAMBs and SOEs. The regression is as follow:
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PAYit = α 0 + α1CASH it + α 2 PERFit −1 + α 3 PSAMBit * PERFit −1
+ α 4 PSOEit * PERFit −1 + α 6 PPRI it * PERFit −1 + α 7 SIZEit
+ α 8 BOARDit + α 9 PONDit + α10 LEVit + α11 DUALITYit

(3)

+ α12TENUREit + α13 FORit + Industry + Year + ε it
where PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) is the cash flow rights of different types of shareholders
if that shareholder is the controlling shareholder. Definitions for all the variables are
shown in Table 1.

3.3. Measurement of variables
Table 1 provides definitions of the variables included in our regression models,
whose selection is explained below.

3.3.1 Managerial compensation
In China, listed firms have had to disclose their levels of managerial compensation
in annual reports since 1998. Because these data are reported as the total of basic
salary and bonus aggregation of the top three executives’ compensation, we base our
empirical analysis on this information. That is, consistent with other studies on China,
we proxy for managerial compensation using the log of the average top three
executives’ remuneration (Kato and Long, 2005).

3.3.2 Firm performance
The empirical corporate finance literature measures firm performance using both
accounting-based performance and market based performance such as return on assets
(Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Kato and Kubo, 2006 and Cheng, 2008), and stock
return (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006 and Firth et al., 2007) respectively. In
addition, we also apply return on sales (ROS) to be robust. Therefore, we use return
on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and annual stock return (RET) to proxy for
firm performance in separate regressions, which is consistent with previous studies.
In addition to these original performance measures, we adopt industry adjusted
measures of ROA, ROS, and RET by calculating the difference between the firm’s
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annual ROA (ROS, RET) and the median ROA (ROS, RET) of firms in the same
industry in the same year. We report our empirical results using industry adjusted
measures as the main proxy for performance. We then repeat our analysis using
Tobin’s Q (Q) as an additional measure of performance, measured as the ratio of
market value to firm replacement value. Following Merhebi et al., (2006) and Firth et
al., (2007), we use the lagged values of these variables in the regressions because
CEO pay responds to a firm’s previous performance.

3.3.3 Cash flow rights and control rights
To examine the effects of ultimate shareholder ownership, we calculate the cash
flow rights and control rights by investigating the complete chain of corporate
ownership. We define the control rights as the weakest link in the chain and cash flow
rights as the product of ownership stakes along the chain, which is consistent with
previous studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). For example, ultimate
controlling shareholder firm A owns 70% shares of listed firm B, which in turn owns
35% shares of listed firm C. We then construct that firm A controls 35% of firm C, the
weakest link in the chain, while the cash flow right is 24.5%, the product of 70% and
35% (70%*35%). Through a pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, and dual-class
stocks, the largest shareholder’s control rights were always in excess of the cash flow
rights (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in the additional tests, we replace cash flow
rights with excess control rights, defined as the difference between control rights and
cash flow rights, to provide some supportive evidence for our main hypotheses. To
determine effective control at any intermediate as well as ultimate level, a cutoff level
of 10% is used in all empirical analyses, which follow the argument used by
Claessens et al. (2002).

3.3.4 Control variables
Firm size
Previous studies established that CEO pay is its positive and significant relation to
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firm size (Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999). Not only are larger firms more likely to
have relatively complicated operating systems and thus be more likely to hire high
quality CEOs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but, as documented by Chen et al. (2009)
among others, there is a significant and positive relationship between firm size and
firm performance in China’s listed firms. Accordingly, we use the log of total firm
assets, SIZE, to proxy for firm size.
Board size
As an internal control mechanism, a board of directors is assumed to ensure that
CEOs act in the best interests of their shareholders (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998).
Small boards of directors are more effective (Yermack, 1996) than large boards
because a large number has less influence over CEOs and complicates decision
making (Jensen, 1993). Hence, we also control board size, BOARD, defining it as the
log of the number of directors on a board.
Board composition
Because independent directors have no conflicting relationship with current
executives, they can exercise their monitoring power and make decisions
independently (Cheng, 2008). We take this into account by defining the variable
POND, the ratio of independent directors to all directors on the boards.
Leverage
Corporate capital structure is an important determinant in shaping pay for top
executives (Basu et al., 2007; Hernan, 2007) and was also found to be linked to firm
performance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Chen et al., 2009), we therefore include
the variable LEV, defined as the ratio of book value of total debts to total assets.
CEO-Chairman duality
Modern theory suggests that ownership and control should be separated (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) and that higher agency problems exist when the CEO is also the
chairman of the board (Yermack, 1996). For instance, Core et al. (1999) found that
CEOs received higher pay when they also chaired the board. We therefore include
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CEO duality, DUALITY, as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also
chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise.
CEO tenure
Although it is usual to relate CEOs’ pay to their years of experience as CEO in a
firm (Palia, 2001), Murphy (1986) suggested that their ability was not observable at
the time of hiring, so payment increased as they proved themselves over the years.
However, Cornett et al. (2008) argued that top executives with little experience
needed more time to become familiar with their firms and industries, but that top
executives with longer tenure, although they have more career concerns, enjoyed
better reputations and can therefore demand higher pay (Brick et al., 2006).
Accordingly, we use the log of CEO tenure, TENURE, as a measure of CEO
experience.
Foreign investors
In China, listed firms can also issue H and N shares, which can only be purchased
by foreign investors. As outside blockholders, these foreign investors can effectively
monitor managers using their professional knowledge. We therefore include the
dummy variable, FOR, coded 1 if a firm has foreign investors and 0 otherwise.
Other control variables
The equations also include two additional dummy variables: Year, a column vector
of a dummy variable to control the economy or market effects over time, and Industry,
a column vector of an SIC-code based dummy variable to control variation across
industries. 6
Table 1
Variable definitions

Variables

Definition

Compensation
Managerial compensation (PAY)

Log of the average top three executives’ compensation

6

We follow Firth et al. (2006) and classify firms in our sample into five groups: industrial, commercial, public
utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). To avoid the dummy variable trap, we use four dummy
variables to represent these five categories.
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Firm performance
Return on assets (ROA)
Return on sales (ROS)
Stock return (RET)
Tobin’s Q (Q)

Net income / total assets
Net income/sales
Annual stock return
Market value/replacement value a

Ownership structure
Cash flow rights (CASH)
Excess control rights (EXCESS)
PSTATE
PSAMB
PSOE
PPRI

Cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling shareholder
Difference between the control rights and cash flow rights
Cash flow rights of state controlled firms
Cash flow rights of SAMB controlled firms
Cash flow rights of SOE controlled firms
Cash flow rights of privately controlled firms

Firm and CEO characteristics
Firm size (SIZE)
Board size (BOARD)
Board composition (POND)
Leverage (LEV)
CEO-chair duality (DUALITY)
CEO tenure (TENURE)
Foreign investor (FOR)

Log of total assets
Log of total directors on board
Independent directors/total directors
Total debts/total assets in book value
Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board
Log of years the CEO has been this position
Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign investors

Other variables
Industry (Industry) b
Year (Year)

Equal to 1 for the specific industry
Equal to 1 for the specific year

a

Market value is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt;

replacement value is measured using the book value of total assets.
b

We create four dummy variables to represent the five groups of listed firms borrowed from Firth et al.

(2006): industrial, commercial, public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries).

3.4. Sample statistics
The first section of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on managerial
compensation, firm performance, and firm and CEO characteristics, averaged across
2002 to 2007 for the entire sample. Panels A, B, and C in this table report detailed
statistics for managerial compensation in these firms based on years, industries, and
dominant shareholders. The means (medians) in Panel A indicate a steady 151.72%
(164.81%) increase in CEO pay across our sample period, ranging from 131,023RMB
(95,666RMB) in 2002 to 329,811RMB (253,333RMB) in 2007. Nonetheless, these
pay levels were much lower than those reported in research for the U.S., U.K., and
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other countries (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006; Merhebi et al., 2006; Kato et al.,
2007; Basu et al., 2007), a pay level gap that may be attributable to smaller firms,
higher rates of CEO turnover, and/or lack of long term incentives7 (Firth et al., 2002;
Kato and Long, 2005).
After identifying three types of firms by ownership (i.e., a SAMB, SOE or private
investors as the controlling shareholder), we find that CEO pay varies across
industries and firms according to the different types of dominant shareholder (see
Table 2). For example, the mean (median) of CEO pay in commercial industry was
236,011RMB (178,683RMB), whereas the mean (median) of CEO pay in property
industry was 339,343RMB (230,000RMB). Likewise, the mean (median) for SAMB
controlled firms was 177,740RMB (129,333RMB), whereas the mean (median) for
SOE controlled firms was 241,229RMB (190,400RMB).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics

Variables
Compensation
CEO average pay
Firm performance
Return on assets (ROA) %
Return on sales (ROS) %
Stock return (RET) %
Tobin’s Q (Q)
Ownership structure
Cash flow rights (CASH)
a

Excess control rights(EXCESS)
Firm characteristic
Assets (millions)
Board size (BOARD)
Board composition (POND)
Capital structure (LEV) %
CEO characteristic
CEO duality (DUALITY)
CEO tenure (TENURE)

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Std. Dev.

219,939

160,000

6,666

470,6667

75,649

2.26
-0.043
39.69
1.16

2.64
0.039
-3.96
0.96

-168.26
-83.69
-90.93
0.13

46.31
46.63
1611.78
23.44

8.49
1.87
104.68
0.76

34.41
6.38

32.17
0

0.51
0

100
70.56

18.11
9.06

3940
9.76
3.13
49.71

1770
9
3
50.25

27.3
4
0
0.02

719000
23
10
1037.51

17600
2.20
0.94
25.87

0.11
2.55

0
2

0
0.08

1
12.42

0.31
1.85

7

Long-term incentive schemes were rare in China’s listed firms accounting for less than 5% of the total listed
firms, and stock options and restricted stocks have only been available to top executives since the end of 2006. For
example, since 2006, there were 161 listed firms who exercised stock options. Until the end of 2009, this number
decreased to 99 and then only 47 by the end of June 2010. Because of data limitation, we still use cash
compensation in this study.
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Panel A: Compensation based on year
2002
131,023
2003
170,329
2004
212,776
2005
218,176
2006
253,069
2007
329,811
Panel B: Compensation based on industry
Industrial
202,353
Commercial
236,011
Public utility
245,134
Property
339,343
Conglomerate
231,535
Panel C: Compensation based on ownership
SAMB
177,740
SOE
241,229
PRIVATE
211,333

95,666
126,666
160,379
167,633
196,666
253,333

6,666
7,666
10,266
8,966
12,000
166,66

1,575,308
1,628,234
3,210,000
2,726,667
3,740,000
470,6667

122,442
153,738
213,192
205,604
243,939
315,655

140,333
178,683
202,383
230,000
185,870

7,200
13,666
11,424
12,566
6,666

3,486,567
1,309,300
1,848,030
4,706,667
1,707,057

209,495
203,546
204,141
485,295
194,260

129,333
190,400
146,966

9,246
7,200
6,666

1,225,333
4,706,667
1,792,933

160,800
212,011
210,226

The figures in Panel A are the average of six years from 2002 to 2007.
The figures for all the value variables are in China’s currency, RMB.
a

Excess control is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow rights of the
ultimate controlling shareholder, which is consistent with Claessens et al. (2002). This information is
only available in the listed firms’ annual reports since 2002.

Table 3
Test of differences in means and medians based on ownership

SAMB vs. SOE
a

SAMB vs. PRIVATE
a

SOE vs. PRIVATE
a

-6.52***
-3.82***
4.86***
b
b
b
-9.34***
-3.81***
-7.17***
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a
b

t-value from the t-test of differences in means.
z-value from the Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in medians.

Table 3 reports the significance of differences in means and medians of CEO pay
between the groups. For example, the t-statistic (z-statistic) of -6.52 (-9.34) in the
comparison of SAMB versus SOE shows that the mean (median) CEO pay was
significantly higher for SOE controlled firms than SAMB controlled firms. These
results can be summarized as follows: the negative t-statistics in the comparisons of
SAMB versus all the other owner types indicate that CEOs in SAMB controlled firms
received lower payments, while the positive t-statistics in the comparisons of SOE
versus all the other owner types suggest that CEOs in SOE controlled firms received
the highest payment among all types of listed firms.
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4. Empirical results
4.1. Pearson correlations
As Table 4 shows, the Pearson correlations between each pair of variables
(contemporaneous value) are lower, which indicates that multi-collinearity does not
exist.
Table 4
Key variables: Pearson correlation matrix

ROA
ROS
RET
Q
SIZE
LEV
BOARD
POND

ROA

ROS

RET

Q

SIZE

LEV

BOARD

POND

1
0.3005
0.1939
-0.0713
0.2443
-0.5270
0.0596
0.0272

1
0.0401
-0.0494
0.0842
-0.1539
0.0296
0.0077

1
0.5153
0.1836
0.0291
-0.0298
0.1798

1
-0.1651
0.3044
-0.0768
0.0894

1
0.0790
0.2126
0.0055

1
0.0003
0.0536

1
-0.2555

1

ROA is firm return on assets (net income divided by total assets); ROS is firm return on sales (net
income divided by total sales). RET is firm stock return; Q is defined as the ratio of market value to
firm replacement value; SIZE is log of total firm assets; LEV is the= ratio of total debts to total assets;
BOARD is the log of total number of directors on the boards; POND is the proportion of independent
directors on the board/ratio of the number of independent directors to total number of directors.

4.2. Empirical results
As shown in Table 5, which presents the results for Equation (1) broken out by
different firm performance measures, the lagged industry-adjusted ROA, ROS, RET
and Tobin’s Q are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay. This result
suggests that top executives tend to be paid more in firms that perform well in the
market, or have higher corporate value. While this result supports our hypotheses,
albeit the significantly positive effect of stock return is inconsistent with findings by
Firth et al. (2007) who argued that market performance does not provide an incentive
to general CEOs 8 . For example, the coefficient on industry adjusted ROA indicates

8

Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 1998 to 2000, Firth et al. (2007) find no relationship between CEO
pay and market performance.
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that one unit increase in industry adjusted ROA lead to a 36.34% increase in CEO pay
level (column 1).
The negative coefficients of CASH (see Table 5) provide evidence that CEO pay
is lower in firms where the largest shareholders have higher cash flow rights, and the
coefficients are significant. Moreover, all the interaction terms used to test whether
ownership is associated with performance based pay for CEOs are positive and
significant, except CASH*RETt-1. This finding not only suggests that when deciding
on CEO pay, state owned firms give more weight to profitability and value, it also
shows that, in support of Hypotheses 1, cash flow rights have a positive incentive
effect on the pay-performance relationship.
In line with previous studies (Conyon, 1997; Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Girma
et al., 2007), our results also show that larger firms paid their managers higher salaries,
and with Basu et al.’s (2007) finding of a significantly negative effect of firm leverage,
managerial compensation is negatively related to leverage, that is, firms with higher
debt pay their managers less. This latter effect may be attributable to debt being seen
as monitoring by external debt holders (John and John, 1993).
Table 5
Regression results of cash flow rights effects on CEO pay
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
CASH
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
CASH*ROAt-1
CASH*ROSt-1
CASH*RETt-1
CASH*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
POND
LEV
DUALITY
TENURE

6.028***(19.46)
-0.007***(-9.02)
1.979***(4.28)

5.500***(17.76)
-0.006***(-8.51)

5.598***(17.30)
-0.005***(-6.83)

4.962***(16.41)
-0.003***(-3.70)

0.018(0.15)
0.183***(3.64)
0.309***(3.94)
0.034***(2.81)
0.016***(4.68)
0.002(1.24)
0.256***(17.92)
0.228***(3.79)
0.553***(2.84)
0.031(0.57)
0.078*(1.95)
0.067***(5.05)

0.284***(20.01)
0.217***(3.57)
0.550**(2.79)
-0.097*(-1.77)
0.071*(1.77)
0.076***(5.69)

0.280***(18.81)
0.221***(3.46)
0.501**(2.41)
-0.168***(-3.37)
0.059(1.38)
0.078***(5.63)

0.005**(2.04)
0.317***(23.03)
0.215***(3.56)
0.398**(2.03)
-0.234***(-4.85)
0.061(1.53)
0.075***(5.65)
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FOR
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

0.377***(8.46)
Included
Included
0.2408
3286

0.364***(8.06)
Included
Included
0.2217
3286

0.368***(7.80)
Included
Included
0.2295
3286

0.349***(7.82)
Included
Included
0.2336
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four variables:
ROA, ROS, RET and Q. We apply the industry-adjusted firm performance in the regressions. CASH is
the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. SIZE, BOARD, POND, LEV, TENURE,
DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Variables such as the size of a board and number of independent directors have a
positive impact on managerial compensation. This interesting result contrasts directly
with Conyon and Peck (1998) and Firth et al. (2007), who found a negative effect of
the size of a board and an insignificant effect of the proportion of independent
directors. Our results, however, are consistent with the evidence that small boards are
more effective (Yermack, 1996) and large boards have a more doubtful influence on
CEOs (Jensen, 1993). It also suggests that the proportion of independent directors is
coming into line with the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC)
mandate that at least one third of board directors, who set CEO pay, should be
independent.
We also find no relationship between duality and CEO pay, which is similar to
Conyon’s (1997) analysis of British firms, but contrary Core et al.’s (1999) findings
that duality in U.S firms lead to higher CEO pay. We do note a positive relationship
between CEO tenure and CEO pay, which is not only consistent with most previous
studies (Brick et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2008) but echoes the intuitive assumption of
a relationship between CEO pay and years of experience (Palia, 2001). Interestingly,
in line with our conjecture, we also find that CEOs receive higher payment if a firm
has foreign investors.
Table 6 reports the regression results for Equation (2) with a primary focus on the
ownership coefficients and interaction terms. A close examination of the interaction
terms also reveals some interesting outcomes. They are positive when we use
profitability to measure performance but are negative when performance is measured
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as stock return and firm value. This result shows that SOEs put great emphasis on
profitability while privately controlled firms care more about market performance. In
fact, during the period of this study, SOEs achieved a higher average growth in
operating sales, which supports Hypotheses 2a. However, the coefficients are only
marginally significant for CASH*ROSt-1, and insignificant for other terms, so we
divide state ownership into two types of firms where the ultimate controlling
shareholder is SAMB and SOE, respectively, and run the regression (3).
Table 6
Regression results of cash flow rights of state and non-state controlled firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
CASH
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
PSTATE*ROAt-1
PSTATE*ROSt-1
PSTATE*RETt-1
PSTATE*Qt-1
Size
Board
Pond
Lev
Duality
Tenure
For
Industry
Year
Adjust R2
Obs

5.992***(19.34)
-0.006***(-8.73)
3.168***(11.20)

5.506***(17.71)
-0.006***(-8.08)

5.589***(17.27)
-0.005***(-6.76)

4.893***(16.18)
-0.005***(-6.40)

0.520***(6.35)
0.232***(8.48)
0.442***(9.27)
0.025(1.18)
0.012*(1.70)
-0.001(-0.43)
0.257***(18.02)
0.223***(3.71)
0.557***(2.86)
0.048(0.92)
0.076*(1.91)
0.067***(5.01)
0.373***(8.37)
Included
Included
0.2393
3286

0.283***(19.86)
0.208***(3.43)
0.552**(2.79)
-0.042(-0.78)
0.068*(1.68)
0.077***(5.70)
0.360***(7.97)
Included
Included
0.2171
3286

0.280***(18.83)
0.221***(3.47)
0.497**(2.39)
-0.164***(-3.32)
0.057(1.34)
0.077***(5.60)
0.368***(7.80)
Included
Included
0.2292
3286

-0.001(-0.02)
0.317***(23.01)
0.217***(3.61)
0.406**(2.07)
-0.233***(-4.82)
0.061(1.52)
0.075***(5.61)
0.347***(7.75)
Included
Included
0.2324
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. CASH is the cash flow rights of the ultimate
controlling shareholder. PSTATE represents the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other
variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

The estimation results of regression (3) are given in Table 7, where we apply the
controlling shareholder cash flow rights to measure the ownership structure. Table 7
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reports generally negative coefficients on cash flow rights regardless of performance
measures which indicate that cash flow rights will reduce the level of CEO pay.
More importantly, we focus on the interaction terms. These terms are positive when
firm performance is measured by ROA and ROS and are statistically significant for
SOE controlled firms. The results indicate that CEO pay is related to profitability and
the cash flow rights of SOEs enhance the pay-performance relationship in SOE
controlled firms, which is consistent with our hypothesis 3a. The coefficients are
economically significant. For example, in column 1 of Table 7, the coefficient of
PSOE*ROAt-1 indicates that a 1% increase in SOE cash flow rights lead to a 3.2%
increase in pay-performance sensitivity. The interaction terms with stock return
measures of performance are positive and only significant when firms have private
investors as the controlling shareholders. This result is consistent with our conjecture
2a that a private controller is more likely to relate CEO pay to market performance,
and again we find evidence that cash flow rights have positive incentive effects on
corporate governance. However, the interaction terms of SAMB controlled firms are
insignificant, which is consistent with Hypotheses 4. The estimated coefficients on
control variables are similar with those reported in Table 5 and 6.
Table 7
Regression results of cash flow rights across three types of firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
CASH
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
PSAMB*ROAt-1
PSOE*ROAt-1
PPRI*ROAt-1
PSAMB*ROSt-1
PSOE*ROSt-1
PPRI*ROSt-1
PSAMB*RETt-1
PSOE*RETt-1
PPRI*RETt-1

6.028***(19.45)
-0.007***(-9.03)
2.139***(4.38)

5.518***(17.79)
-0.006***(-8.50)

5.597***(17.29)
-0.005***(-6.83)

4.705***(10.26)
-0.002**(-2.12)

0.079(0.52)
0.181***(3.57)
0.073(1.21)
0.021(0.85)
0.032**(2.68)
0.015(0.56)
0.012(1.58)
0.015***(4.33)
0.009(1.15)
0.002(0.53)
0.002(1.18)
0.002*(1.78)
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PSAMB*Qt-1
PSOE*Qt-1
PPRI*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
POND
LEV
TENURE
FOR
DUALITY
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

0.256***(17.91)
0.227***(3.78)
0.556***(2.85)
0.030(0.58)
0.067***(5.05)
0.375***(8.42)
0.078*(1.95)
Included
Included
0.2410
3286

0.283***(19.89)
0.216***(3.52)
0.549***(2.78)
-0.084(-1.50)
0.076***(5.66)
0.363***(8.05)
0.072*(1.78)
Included
Included
0.2219
3286

0.280***(18.81)
0.221**(3.46)
0.501*(2.41)
-0.168(-3.37)
0.078***(5.63)
0.368***(7.80)
0.059(1.38)
Included
Included
0.2295
3286

0.008(1.60)
0.005**(2.46)
0.009**(1.96)
0.317***(15.35)
0.158*(1.88)
0.735**(2.89)
-0.182*(-1.86)
0.085***(6.00)
0.332***(5.17)
0.082(1.43)
Included
Included
0.1927
3286

PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the cash flow rights of each type of controlling shareholder. All the
other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

In order to provide some supplementary evidence and disentangle the incentive
and entrenchment effects of the largest shareholder, we repeat our analyses of
regression (1) to (3) by replacing cash flow rights (CASH) with ultimate controlling
shareholder excess control rights (EXCESS). The results are shown in Table 8 to 10.
Our primary focus is on the interaction terms between ownership and performance.
The general results show negative coefficients for most interaction terms which
helped support Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, that deviation between control rights and
cash flow rights have negative entrenchment effects on corporate governance, which
is reflected by a weaker pay-performance relationship. We obtain opposite results
when excess control rights are used instead of cash flow rights. These results are
broadly consistent with previous studies on the separation of ownership and control
(La Porta et al., 1999; Cleassens et al., 2002). Meanwhile, we find there is a positive
relationship between CEO pay and excess control rights, which is consistent with the
argument that it is easier for a CEO to expropriate wealth where corporate governance
is weak, reflected by a higher divergence between control rights and cash flow rights
(Core et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002).
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Table 8
Regression results of excess control rights effects on CEO pay
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
EXCESS
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
EXCESS*ROAt-1
EXCESS*ROSt-1
EXCESS*RETt-1
EXCESS*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
POND
LEV
DUALITY
TENURE
FOR
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

6.160***(19.67)
0.003**(2.14)
3.085***(9.73)

5.665***(18.09)
0.003**(2.37)

6.049***(19.70)
0.002(1.32)

5.202***(17.16)
0.001(0.30)

0.503***(5.68)
0.255***(11.80)
0.565***(11.07)
-0.034(-1.26)
-0.012*(-1.51)
-0.005**(-2.53)
0.232***(16.48)
0.261***(4.29)
0.650***(3.30)
0.071(1.35)
0.072***(5.38)
0.106**(2.63)
0.391***(8.67)
Included
Included
0.2227
3286

0.259***(18.53)
0.248***(4.02)
0.629***(3.16)
-0.019(-0.35)
0.082***(6.03)
0.095**(2.34)
0.374***(8.21)
Included
Included
0.2028
3286

0.247***(18.18)
0.266***(4.40)
0.498**(2.55)
-0.125**(-2.60)
0.075***(5.64)
0.086**(2.15)
0.395***(8.83)
Included
Included
0.2320
3286

-0.012***(-3.02)
0.296***(21.99)
0.242***(4.00)
0.451**(2.29)
-0.209***(-4.34)
0.079***(5.93)
0.078**(1.96)
0.366***(8.16)
Included
Included
0.2262
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four variables:
ROA, ROS, RET and Q. We apply the industry-adjusted firm performance in the regressions. EXCESS
is the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. SIZE, BOARD, POND, LEV,
TENURE, DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 9
Regression results of excess control rights of state and non-state controlled firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
EXCESS
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
PSTATE*ROAt-1
PSTATE*ROSt-1
PSTATE*RETt-1
PSTATE*Qt-1

6.167***(19.69)
0.003**(2.04)
2.996***(10.74)

5.647***(18.05)
0.003**(2.33)

5.802***(17.88)
0.003**(2.24)

5.141***(16.97)
0.003*(1.64)

0.521***(6.64)
0.264***(9.55)
0.513***(11.15)
0.046(1.34)
0.029**(2.72)
0.005(1.51)
0.007*(1.93)
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Size
Board
Pond
Lev
Duality
Tenure
For
Industry
Year
Adjust R2
Obs

0.233***(16.49)
0.258***(4.24)
0.655***(3.33)
0.063(1.18)
0.104**(2.60)
0.072***(5.39)
0.391***(8.69)
Included
Included
0.2228
3286

0.261***(18.62)
0.248***(4.04)
0.655***(3.28)
-0.051(-0.92)
0.096**(2.38)
0.083***(6.09)
0.378***(8.30)
Included
Included
0.2041
3286

0.256***(17.67)
0.246***(3.83)
0.599**(2.87)
-0.136**(-2.74)
0.078*(1.82)
0.081***(5.87)
0.388***(8.17)
Included
Included
0.2192
3286

0.298***(22.10)
0.246***(4.05)
0.459**(2.33)
-0.211***(-4.37)
0.077*(1.94)
0.079***(5.91)
0.365***(8.13)
Included
Included
0.2249
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. EXCESS is the excess control rights of the
ultimate controlling shareholder. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control rights of
each type of controlling shareholder. All other variables are defined the same as those in previous
tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 10
Regression results of excess control rights across three types of firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
EXCESS
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
PSAMB*ROAt-1
PSOE*ROAt-1
PPRI*ROAt-1
PSAMB*ROSt-1
PSOE*ROSt-1
PPRI*ROSt-1
PSAMB*RETt-1
PSOE*RETt-1
PPRI*RETt-1
PSAMB*Qt-1
PSOE*Qt-1
PPRI*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
POND
LEV

6.163***(19.67)
0.003**(2.07)
3.080***(9.71)

5.673***(18.12)
0.003**(2.18)

5.799***(17.87)
0.003**(2.30)

5.248***(17.26)
0.003**(2.11)

0.527***(5.90)
0.279***(9.27)
0.568***(11.09)
-0.048(-0.59)
-0.015(-0.41)
-0.050*(-1.88)
-0.010(-1.07)
-0.020(-1.32)
-0.029**(-2.61)
-0.002(-0.13)
-0.006(-1.42)
-0.006*(-1.73)

0.233***(16.48)
0.260***(4.28)
0.651***(3.30)
0.065(1.22)

0.259***(18.52)
0.247***(4.01)
0.650***(3.26)
-0.044(-0.79)

0.257***(17.68)
0.245***(3.81)
0.596***(2.86)
-0.135**(-2.71)

-0.038(-0.18)
-0.017***(-2.91)
-0.010**(-2.61)
0.294***(21.81)
0.243***(4.01)
0.413**(2.10)
-0.205***(-4.25)
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0.072***(5.38)
0.106**(2.63)
0.390***(8.65)
Included
Included
0.2229
3286

0.082***(6.01)
0.097**(2.40)
0.375***(8.23)
Included
Included
0.2049
3286

0.082***(5.91)
0.078*(1.84)
0.388***(8.19)
Included
Included
0.2197
3286

0.079***(5.95)
0.084**(2.10)
0.369***(8.22)
Included
Included
0.2284
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control
rights of each type of controlling shareholder. All the other variables are defined the same as those in
previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

4.3. Endogeneity problem
Because endogeneity was one potential problem for this study, in our regressions
we consider firm performance an exogenous variable that, together with other
explanatory variables, has an explanatory impact on managerial compensation.
However, because firm performance can still be seen as an endogenous variable and a
function of other firm-specific characteristics, we check the robustness of the results
by estimating our three regressions using 2SLS. In the first stage we use an OLS
model to obtain the fitted values of firm performance by regressing it on a set of
lagged control variables in regression (1). In the second stage the fitted values are
used in place of the firm performance in regressions that are the same as those
reported in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7. The general results are similar to those
shown in previous tables but for the sake of brevity we only report the results of the
first regression in Tables 11.
Table 11
2SLS estimation of regression (1)

Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Panel A: 2SLS estimation results of regression (1)
Constant
6.098***(17.10) 5.450***(16.83)
CASH
-0.006**(-2.32) -0.007***(-2.71)
ROAt-1
1.369***(3.79)
ROSt-1
0.053**(2.04)
RETt-1

7.388***(16.94)
-0.013***(-2.74)

5.022***(16.10)
-0.008***(-2.05)

0.175***(6.36)
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CASH*ROAt-1
CASH*ROSt-1
CASH*RETt-1
CASH*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
POND
LEV
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0.259(0.07)
0.169*(1.94)
0.052**(2.03)
0.051***(4.38)
0.246***(13.97)
0.198***(3.68)
0.763***(4.61)
0.091(1.36)
0.098***(2.81)
0.077***(6.25)
0.377***(9.66)
Included
Included
0.2012
4895

0.274***(18.18)
0.187***(3.50)
0.760***(4.55)
-0.077(-1.24)
0.091**(2.57)
0.086***(7.24)
0.364***(9.07)
Included
Included
0.1829
4895

0.190***(10.41)
0.241***(4.44)
0.441**(2.43)
-0.081*(-1.70)
0.089**(2.22)
0.068***(4.47)
0.428***(9.99)
Included
Included
0.1215
4895

0.012*(1.69)
0.297***(19.07)
0.185***(3.57)
0.758***(4.45)
-0.144***(-3.06)
0.081**(2.44)
0.095***(7.40)
0.349***(8.72)
Included
Included
0.1775
4895

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four variables:
ROA, ROS, RET and Q. We apply the industry-adjusted firm performance in the regressions. All the
other variables are measured as in Table 5.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

We repeat the analyses by winsorizing the top and bottom 1% of the CEO pay
variable to excluding any influence from the outliers, and the results are broadly
consistent with those shown in the previous tables. All firm performance coefficients
are positive and significant. More important, the interaction terms between cash flow
rights and firm performance are all positive and PSOE*ROAt-1, PSOE*ROSt-1 and
PPRI*RETt-1 are statistically significant.

5. Conclusion
China’s ongoing economic reform and corporate restructuring, which focuses
primarily on improving management, is accelerating the corporatization of traditional
SOEs. CEO and top manager’s incentives, being the central theme in such reform, are
poorly understood. We therefore take advantage of data produced since the 2002
mandate that listed firms in China disclose the largest shareholder cash flow rights
and control rights in their annual reports to examine the effects on the relationship
between managerial compensation and firm performance.
Our empirical results show that cash flow rights in the hands of the ultimate
28

controlling shareholder have an incentive effect on the pay-performance relationship.
In particular, the higher cash flow rights can better align CEO pay with firm
profitability in SOEs, and stock return in privately controlled firms. We also provide
similar evidence to Claessens et al. (2002), that divergence between control rights and
cash flow rights have negative entrenchment effects on the pay-performance
relationship. These observations suggest that the development of a market economy in
China has important implications for CEO pay.
In the Chinese context, we examine the pay-performance relationship in firms
where different types of controlling owners have dissimilar objectives and
motivations. Our multivariate analysis results show that the pay-performance scheme
has been effective in SOE and privately controlled firms, albeit depending on different
performance measures. In SOEs, CEO pay is linked to firm accounting performance
(ROA and ROS). This is consistent with controlling state owners whose shares are
non-tradable but who are entitled to cash flows. In privately controlled firms, however,
CEO pay is sensitive to market performance, which is consistent with literature on US
firms.
Overall, our study results indicate that ownership structure and types of
controlling shareholders have jointly affected the CEO pay-performance relationship.
Therefore, to better understand the causes and consequences of CEO compensation,
future studies should focus on the unique characteristics of the institutional
environment, such as corporate governance and ownership structure.
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